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Corruption takes place when public officials break the law in pursuit of their 
private interest. But public officials can break different laws in different ways with 
different implications for the public good. The factors driving corruption and the 
effects of corruption can therefore vary widely. Understanding the causes and 
consequences of corruption is particularly important in developing countries, which 
almost without exception suffer from high levels of corruption. The virtual uniformity 
of this evidence strongly suggests that developing countries must share some 
powerful common drivers of corruption that are different from those that affect 
advanced industrial countries. At the same time, the very diverse economic 
performance of developing countries suggests that not all developing countries suffer 
from the same types of corruption. These two observations, summarized in our first 
section, provide the backdrop to my analytical investigation. I begin this investigation 
by identifying the drivers of corruption implicit in most conventional neoclassical 
economic analysis of the topic. Although these drivers are undoubtedly important in 
many contexts, I next argue that a number of other drivers of corruption may be more 
important in developing countries. These countries have several critical structural 
features that are recognized in the broader social science literature but the 
implications of these features for the economic analysis of corruption have not been 
adequately developed. We argue that the types of corruption generated by these 
structural features of developing countries are much less amenable to the types of 
anti-corruption measures that are prescribed by the conventional analysis of 
corruption. I then use this analysis to provide an alternative classification of types of 
corruption in developing countries and suggest that policy has to be appropriate to the 
drivers of corruption most relevant in particular countries. The implications of this 
analysis for anti-corruption strategies in developing countries are discussed in the 
final section. 
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Corruption in Developing Countries: the Evidence  
The evidence from across the developing world tells us there are very few developing 
countries that have low levels of corruption. The few low-corruption developing 
countries tend to be exceptional and are not necessarily the fastest growing 
developers. Although there are many problems with subjective corruption indices, 
they suffice to show the broad features of the problem. The earliest year for which 
corruption data are available across a broad range of countries is 1984, and we use the 
corruption indices provided by the IRIS center at the University of Maryland. This 
index ranges from 0 (the highest level of corruption) to 6 (the lowest level). Data are 
available for 85 countries. Table 1 summarizes the data and the per capita GDP 
growth rate of these countries over the period 1980-90 with the population split into 
three groups. The advanced industrialized countries are the first group. These 
countries have relatively low corruption indices and moderate rates of growth. 
Developing countries are split into two groups: a group of converging developers 
whose per capita growth rate is higher than the advanced country average, and a third 
group of developing countries with growth rates below the advanced country average, 
which were consequently falling behind in relative terms.  
 
Table 1 shows that there is virtually no difference in the median level of corruption 
between high-growth and low-growth developing countries. The same data are shown 
graphically in Figure 1. The low-growth countries are more than four times as 
numerous as the high-growth countries, and so it is not entirely surprising that their 
corruption indices show a greater range of variation. Apart from that, there is no 
discernible pattern in the figures except that developing countries on average seem to 
suffer from higher levels of corruption compared to advanced countries.  
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 Table 1 Corruption and Growth 1980-90 
 Median Corruption Index 1984 (Range) 
Median per capita growth rate 
1980-90 
(Range) 
Advanced 
Industrialized 
n=21 
(3 - 6) (1.4-4.4) 
Developers 
n=12 (1-5) (2.4-8.8) 
n=52 
2.6 
(0-6) 
-1.0 
(-6.3-2) 
Countries 
5.4 2.2 
Converging 3 3.5 
Other Developing 
Countries 
Source: IRIS-3 (2000), World Bank (1992). The corruption index ranges from 0 for maximum 
corruption to 6 for minimum corruption. 
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Figure 1 Corruption and Growth 1980-90 
 
Thus, two observations stand out in the table and in the scatter diagram. First, 
advanced industrialized economies tend to have lower levels of corruption than 
developing economies. This suggests that the level of development may be an 
important determinant of the chances of reducing corruption. Secondly, within the 
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group of poorer economies, the median country in the high-growth developing 
country group does not have significantly lower corruption levels than the median 
country in the group that is falling behind. Given the obviously damaging effects of 
corruption in many contexts, we read this observation not as saying that corruption 
has no effect on economic performance, but rather that corruption is likely to have 
very different effects in different contexts. These observations will inform our 
investigation of the economic analysis of corruption and the relevance of the drivers 
f corruption identified in much of the literature that is influencing policy-making in 
te, the mix of 
pes of corruption that prevails differs widely, and this divergence helps to explain 
o
developing countries.  
 
An inspection of the data is particularly important given the growing number of 
sophisticated econometric studies that find some relationship between corruption and 
economic performance (many of these are reviewed in Lambsdorff 2005 and 
Kaufmann and Kraay this volume). Finding a relationship, however, does not tell us 
anything about causation. We need to examine the theoretical arguments closely 
before accepting the link between corruption and economic performance that has been 
suggested by a number of frequently quoted econometric studies (Knack and Keefer 
1995; Mauro 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Mauro 1997; Johnson, et al. 1998; Hall 
and Jones 1999; Kauffman, et al. 1999). These studies typically establish a strong 
relationship between corruption (and other governance indicators) and per capita 
incomes. This is entirely consistent with the data showing a significant difference in 
the corruption index between advanced and developing countries. However, for 
corruption to be a policy target we need to establish a causal relationship going from 
corruption to economic growth. This relationship is typically rather weak and often 
disappears with the inclusion of variables such as the investment rate (Mo 2001). This 
too is consistent with the crude data and suggests that the causal relationship between 
corruption and economic performance is too unreliable to be the basis of significant 
policy efforts without further investigation of the underlying theory (Khan 2004). In 
the next four sections, we identify four different types of corruption in developing 
countries, the factors driving their emergence and persistence, the likely economic 
effects of each and the likely countermeasures that could be adopted. We argue that 
although all developing countries have high corruption in the aggrega
ty
the very different net effects of corruption across developing countries. 
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  ‘Neoclassical’ Corruption: Seeking Bribes through Damaging Interventions  
The most commonly used models of corruption derived from neoclassical economics 
assume that corruption is driven by the legal powers of the state that give public 
officials the ability to disrupt otherwise efficient markets. This allows them to create 
rents or obstacles for private investors and citizens, in most cases, acting inside the 
law. These powers give public officials the ability to bargain for kickbacks or bribes 
in exchange for allocating rents to those who can pay for them or removing obstacles 
in the path of those who would rather pay than suffer delay or obstruction (Klitgaard 
1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978 and 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). The kickbacks and 
bribes are, of course, illegal, and constitute corruption. Although the ability to create 
rents and restrictions is important, public officials must also have the incentive to 
break the law by seeking bribes in these ways, which means that the expected benefit 
 the official of engaging in corruption has to be greater than the expected cost of the to
potential punishment.  
 
Low Opportunity Cost of Corruption
Incentives of Officials to Illegally Ration Rents or 
Remove Obstacles in Exchange for Bribes
Interventionist State Policies
Formal/Legal State Capacities to Create 
(Damaging) Rents and Restrictions in Markets
Creation of harmful rents Loss of investible 
Net negative effect is substantial
and restrictions resources in bribes+
 
Figure 2 Drivers and Effects of 'Neoclassical' Corruption 
 
The two critical drivers of what we will call ‘neoclassical’ corruption are shown in 
Figure 2. First, this type of corruption requires the existence of formal state capacities 
so that public officials can legally create rents of different types, or impose obstacles 
to the operation of markets. The creation of rents means that some potential 
beneficiaries will be willing to pay a price to get access to these rents, and similarly, 
the creation of obstacles means that some market actors will be willing to pay to avoid 
them. The formal powers of the state to create rents and restrictions thus create the 
potential for corruption. But for corruption to take place, a second condition is that 
public officials must have the incentive to break the law and allocate these rents for a 
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price to those who can pay for them, or to remove obstacles for those who can afford 
to pay for their removal. Because this part of the exchange is typically illegal (and 
therefore constitutes corruption), public officials must have a low opportunity cost of 
being caught in the act. The opportunity cost of being caught and losing the public 
position is low if the salary of the public official is low, if risk of detection is low, and 
if the probability of being found guilty and being punished is low even after detection. 
Because these conditions are commonly observed in most developing countries, the 
rmal ability of the state to create rents and restrictions in markets leads to 
 money), or for not harassing the innocent by deliberately misinterpreting 
ery complex and unclear regulations (customs officials or police engaging in petty 
erception of 
wlessness in developing countries. Of course, police corruption and bureaucratic 
corruption can be much more serious and predatory, as we will see later. 
fo
widespread corruption.  
 
The obstacles and rents created by public officials seeking bribes can range from the 
unnecessary red tape and paper pushing that takes on iconic proportions in many 
developing countries, to the creation of monopolies, tariffs, subsidies and other 
damaging rents that are both directly damaging for the economy, as well as creating 
rent-seeking opportunities for public officials and others. Excessive regulation and 
requirements of permissions often have no purpose except to enable bureaucrats to 
extract bribes from the private sector. This type of corruption also includes “petty 
corruption” involving low-level officials extracting small bribes for performing their 
duties (speed
v
extortion).  
 
This is often the most visible face of corruption in developing countries and, in 
opinion surveys, public irritation with these types of corruption often dominates. 
Police corruption, for example, often takes top position in popular perceptions of the 
worst types of corruption. Some police corruption is petty corruption where traffic 
police (like customs officials and other low level bureaucrats) find opportunities for 
corruption while implementing complex and poorly defined laws. Although these 
types of corruption are very irksome and can affect a great number of people, they are 
not necessarily the most damaging type of corruption for the economy. Nevertheless, 
petty corruption is damaging, the payoffs are regressive in that the victims are very 
often the poor, and they increase transaction costs and the general p
la
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 When these types of restrictions and laws exist, some corruption can actually enable 
investors and ordinary citizens to avoid damaging obstacles that impede the operation 
of the market. Indeed at one time, it was argued that in a second-best sense, some 
corruption of this type could be efficiency enhancing given the context (Leff 1964; 
Huntington 1968). However, the ability of the state to make unnecessary laws can 
encourage the creation of more and more artificial restrictions and more and more red 
tape to increase opportunities for extraction (Myrdal 1968: 937-51). The social waste 
associated with this could be considerable according to some models of these 
processes (Krueger 1974). Nor can corruption be restricted only to those areas where 
the effects may be desirable even in a second-best sense (Rose-Ackerman 1978). 
Today the consensus is that for corruption of this type, the best policy would be to 
remove the unnecessary restrictions, rather than hope that corruption would enable the 
conomy to work its way around these obstacles.  
ruption (shown in Figure 
) is therefore likely to be significant (Khan 1996a, 2000b).  
 
e
 
The economic cost of this corruption is twofold. First, there is a rent-seeking cost, 
which is the cost of the resources used up in seeking the rents or overcoming the 
restrictions. This includes the loss of potentially investible resources in bribes 
transferred to public officials, who are assumed to use them less efficiently, leading to 
a reduction in investment. It also includes other resources that are used up, for 
instance by public officials seeking to maintain their positions in lucrative parts of the 
bureaucracy. Second, there is a social cost due to the rents and restrictions created by 
public officials. The damaging rents that states can create include monopoly rents, 
import restrictions that generate monopoly rents, subsidies to infant industries that 
never grow up, and transfers and subsidies to special interest groups. Each of these 
generates deadweight losses for society. Similarly, restrictions and obstacles in 
markets increase transaction costs and result in efficiency losses. The effects of these 
rents and restrictions are therefore reductions in economic efficiency and deadweight 
welfare losses that can result in further reductions of investment. The overall effect of 
corruption is the sum of these two different effects, the loss of resources in rent 
seeking and the adverse effects of the rents and interventions created by bribe-seeking 
public officials. The overall negative effect of this type of cor
2
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The policy advice that derives from the analysis of this type of corruption targets both 
sets of drivers. First, corruption of this type is likely to be reduced if the discretionary 
legal capacity of public officials to impose restrictions or create rents can be reduced 
through liberalization, privatization and reforms to “rightsize” the state so that it only 
provides essential public services. Secondly, corruption will also be reduced if the 
opportunity cost of corruption can be raised. This can be achieved through higher 
salaries for public officials (financed if necessary by reducing their overall number), 
greater transparency in the allocation of public resources and more effective judicial 
processes for dealing with those charged with corruption (World Bank 1997, 2000). 
These measures increase the expected cost of engaging in corrupt acts, and are likely 
to reduce the incidence of corruption.  
 
However, the empirical results tracing the impact of such policy interventions on the 
level of corruption have produced very limited results. Contrary to the policy analysis 
discussed above, observations of developing countries show that the mix between 
public and private sectors, interventionist or liberal economic policies, the presence or 
absence of democracy, the degree of centralization or decentralization of government 
or the salaries of public officials have relatively little effect on the overall extent of 
corruption. Developing countries that follow policies of low intervention and have 
active civil society participation in politics do not tend to have significantly lower 
corruption than those that have more interventions or have authoritarian political 
regimes (Treisman 2000; Khan 2002). To make sense of this evidence and to come up 
with better policy responses, we need to look at a number of other possible drivers of 
corruption in developing countries. 
 
‘Statist’ Corruption: Seeking Bribes with Potentially Beneficial Interventions 
A significant underlying assumption in the ‘neoclassical’ analysis of corruption is that 
in seeking bribes, public officials primarily create damaging rents and market 
restrictions. The implicit assumption is that the range of necessary public goods that 
states need to provide for market economies to operate efficiently is rather limited. 
This assumption is important for simplifying the analysis, so that the capacity of the 
state to intervene is itself one of the drivers of the neoclassical corruption summarized 
in Figure 2. However, if the range of potentially beneficial state interventions is a 
wide one, there is a possibility that there may be different types of corruption with 
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different effects. In this case, the drivers explaining the dominance of different types 
of corruption are inevitably more complex than in the simple model discussed earlier.  
 
In fact, neoclassical economics recognizes a wide range of market failures and, 
therefore, acknowledges the possibility of potentially beneficial state interventions. 
These beneficial interventions are in turn very likely to create rents and market 
restrictions, but in this case, the creation of these rents may represent significant 
second-best improvements. The importance of some of these rents has been pointed 
out by asymmetric information economics, which established that a range of rents 
may be beneficial and even necessary for the operation of market economies in the 
context of asymmetric information (Stiglitz 1996). Heterodox economics looking at 
late developers has identified an even wider range of rents and interventions that can 
potentially accelerate economic development if properly managed. These include 
rents that can create additional incentives for accelerating the acquisition of new 
technologies or help development by maintaining political stability (Amsden 1989; 
Wade 1990; Rodrik 1995; Aoki, et al. 1997; Lall and Teubal 1998; Woo-Cumings 
1999; Khan and Jomo 2000; Khan 2002; Rodrik 2002; Khan 2004).  
 
The possibility of growth-enhancing rents and interventions raises a number of critical 
questions for the analysis of corruption in developing countries. If a range of 
beneficial rents can be created by states, this gives the state discretionary powers to 
determine which of these rents will be created, how they will be allocated and what 
conditions have to be fulfilled for beneficiaries to continue to receive these rents. 
Some rent seeking will inevitably follow although the rent seeking cost can vary 
depending on institutional and political conditions (Khan 2000b). Some of this rent 
seeking can take the form of corruption, particularly in developing countries where 
the opportunity cost of corruption is low. But under these conditions, corruption can 
potentially have ambiguous effects. Unlike the simple case of neoclassical corruption 
shown in Figure 2 where both the rent the state creates and the rent-seeking cost in the 
form of bribes have a negative effect, in the case of statist corruption there are two 
offsetting effects.  
 
The rent or restriction created may now have a positive effect that may offset the 
negative economic effect of bribes and other rent seeking costs. The type of 
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intervention and rent created now becomes of critical significance. The beneficial 
effect of the intervention may even be large enough to offset the negative effect of the 
bribe, such that the net effect of the intervention is now positive. “Positive” in this 
context means that society would be worse off without the intervention than with the 
intervention including the negative effects of corruption. Of course, society would be 
even better off if the intervention could be organized without any corruption, but it 
would be unrealistic to assume that an intervention that creates a rent can be managed 
without a rent-seeking cost. Even if the corruption could be replaced with legal rent 
seeking, there would still be a rent-seeking cost, but in just the same way, society may 
be better off with these beneficial interventions even if they entail significant rent-
seeking costs (Khan 1996a, 2000a, 2000b). It is always preferable to replace 
corruption with legal rent seeking if only because the latter can be regulated to ensure 
that its damaging effects are minimized. The policy challenge is then not one of 
organizing liberalization, but of strengthening state capacities for beneficial 
intervention, converting any illegal rent seeking into legal forms and regulating this 
rent seeking to ensure that the beneficial aspects of the intervention are maximized.  
 
Figure 3 shows the drivers and effects of what I call ‘statist’ corruption. The outcome 
depends critically on the political economy of rent management. This is the process of 
rent seeking through which the types of interventions and associated rents are 
determined, together with the absorption of resources in different forms of rent 
seeking including both bribes and legal forms of rent seeking, such as lobbying, 
political contributions and so on. We can distinguish between two quite different 
possibilities as shown in Figure 3. Value-enhancing outcomes, shown along the left-
hand fork arise if the political economy of the rent creation process permits the 
creation and effective management of rents that create incentives for economic 
growth, and if the resource cost of rent seeking or corruption does not outweigh this 
benefit. In this case, economic development can coexist with substantial corruption, or 
in the absence of corruption, with substantial rent seeking. Corruption operates here as 
a tax that public officials collect from the growth-generating beneficiaries of rents. In 
the case of legal rent seeking, rent seekers contribute to political parties or hire 
lobbyists. As it is likely that a growing economy will allow more bribes or legal 
benefits for public officials over time, we can assume that, ceteris paribus, public 
officials (if they could act collectively) would prefer this outcome. Value-enhancing 
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state intervention coexisting with substantial corruption is frequently observed in 
high-growth developing countries such as South Korea in the sixties, or in 
contemporary China (Khan 1996b). Legal rent seeking by dynamic producers in 
advanced countries (for instance to protect their innovation rents or to lobby for tax 
breaks) is generally also of this variety. 
 
Corruption (or legal rent seeking)
appears as a “malign” process
that protects inefficiency (most
developing countries)
Value-Reducing Outcomes
Benefit of Rent minus
Rent-Seeking Cost is Negative
Corruption (or legal rent-seeking)
appears as “benign” profit-sharing
with the state (South Korea, China,
most advanced countries)
Value-Enhancing Outcomes
Benefit of Rent minus
Rent-Seeking Cost is Positive
Political Economy determining Types of Rents and Rent-Seeking
Economic Imperatives Driving Interventions
(for instance, to enhance Accumulation or Technology Acquisition)
 
Figure 3 Drivers and Effects of Statist Corruption 
 
In contrast, the right-hand fork in Figure 3 shows that value-reducing outcomes are 
also possible, where the net effect of rent management is negative. This could either 
be because the cost of the rent seeking is too high, or more likely, that the rents 
themselves are damaging. The damaging rents in this case are potentially beneficial 
rents that are poorly managed and allocated. The overall effect together with the rent-
seeking cost is negative, just as in the pure neoclassical case. Indeed, the two can be 
difficult to distinguish because potentially beneficial rents can have damaging effects 
if they are badly managed or allocated. For example, a potentially valuable subsidy 
for technology acquisition can become a damaging rent if inefficient subsidy 
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recipients fail to acquire technology and are able to pay to keep the subsidy in place 
even though it is ineffective. The effect of this rent is the same as if public officials 
had created wasteful subsidies in the first place, and used their capacity to allocate 
these rents to extract bribes from subsidy recipients. Thus, cases of corruption that 
appear to be neoclassical corruption (where damaging rents are deliberately created to 
extract bribes) may be difficult to distinguish from corruption associated with failed 
statist interventions where states fail to manage potentially beneficial rents effectively 
so that the rents appear to be damaging ex post.  
 
Comparing the two types of outcomes in Figure 3, the paradox in the case of value-
reducing outcomes is that the total bribes collected here may often be lower than in 
the case of value-enhancing outcomes where developmental rents are effectively 
implemented. We can assume that if public officials could determine the political 
economy of rent management, they would collectively prefer to achieve value-
enhancing outcomes, if only because this would maximize the bribes or legal benefits 
that they could collect over time. This is a stronger version of Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny’s (1993) conclusion that coordinated corruption is less damaging than 
uncoordinated corruption. It follows that if public officials have the power to create 
rents; their decision to create damaging rather than beneficial rents has to be 
explained because they could in theory benefit even more from the latter. One 
possibility is that state institutions are fragmented and individual public officials 
create rents to collect bribes for themselves and are unable to coordinate with other 
officials to maximize the total bribe. This is the explanation that Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) suggest, although their model is one of neoclassical corruption where the rents 
created are always damaging. Nevertheless, they show that coordination to maximize 
the bribe collected can limit the creation of damaging rents. If states can create 
beneficial rents as well, the effect of a failure to coordinate state agencies would be 
even stronger. Another possibility is that rent-seeking factions in society are powerful 
but fragmented, so that factions can veto re-allocations of rents away from themselves 
regardless of the social cost (Khan 1996b). For instance, it may be potentially very 
beneficial to provide emerging entrepreneurs with tax breaks or other resources to 
accelerate their acquisition of new technology. However, if inefficient capitalists can 
easily join political factions that can exert pressure to protect their subsidies 
regardless of efficiency, a potentially beneficial policy can be subverted by what 
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appears to be corruption. In fact, the inefficiency-generating corruption is only a 
manifestation of a deeper problem, the fragmentation of political power. Unless 
reforms can restructure political organizations, anti-corruption strategies by 
themselves will not achieve much because legal rent seeking will be almost as 
harmful as illegal payoffs in these cases.  
 
An analysis of the drivers of statist corruption shows that the policy recommendations 
coming from the neoclassical analysis of corruption can be counterproductive. If the 
rent-creating intervention of the state can be potentially beneficial for the economy, 
removing or limiting the rent-creation capacities of the state may be inappropriate. 
This would obviously be true for those cases where corruption was associated with 
value-enhancing interventions (the left hand fork in Figure 3). Even in these cases, 
corruption is a social cost and is certainly not functional, as used to be argued by 
some early analysts (such as Leff 1964). But even if corruption is a social cost, the 
appropriate social response should be to try to regulate and reduce the cost of the rent 
seeking, not to do away with the rents. Zero corruption could be achieved by 
removing the relevant rent creation capacities of the state, but society would be worse 
off as a result.  
 
The more interesting question arises in the cases (unfortunately the majority) where 
the underlying political economy of rent management subverts decisions about the 
types of rents to be created and their allocation so that the outcome is value reducing 
(the right hand fork in Figure 3). Here the neoclassical response of limiting state 
capacities may appear to be appropriate because in these cases it would be 
arithmetically true that shutting down both the rent and the associated corruption 
would leave society better off. But closer reflection suggests that in many cases this 
response would be inappropriate. It would only make sense to scale back the 
interventionist capacities of the state if nothing could be done to address the 
underlying political economic situation. If something can be done, then addressing the 
political economy drivers responsible for subverting potentially beneficial 
interventions may be more fruitful for society than to respond as if the problem was 
one of neoclassical corruption.  
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Political Corruption and Clientelism 
Neoclassical and statist corruption each raise different policy challenges, but they are 
both essentially driven by states that legally create rents and public officials who 
illegally benefit from the associated rent seeking. In contrast, the drivers of political 
corruption in developing countries raise some entirely new issues. These drivers 
derive from the imperatives of political stabilization in the context of 
underdevelopment. Political stabilization in any country entails the redistribution of 
incomes. But in advanced industrialized countries, the process through which this 
redistribution is achieved has characteristics that are quite different from those of the 
typical developing country. Two of these differences are significant, and together, 
they help to explain why political stabilization in advanced countries can typically be 
achieved through transparent redistributions through the fiscal process. In contrast, 
political stabilization in developing countries typically involves off-budget transfers 
that usually involve political corruption.  
 
The first and most obvious difference between countries at different levels of 
development is that richer countries with large productive sectors in the regulated or 
formal sector find it much easier to collect a significant share of national income in 
taxes. This allows advanced countries to respond to political organizations demanding 
redistribution with a range of transparent and legal transfers and public service 
delivery. In contrast, countries where the formal or modern sector is still small find 
that not only is their national income small, but also they can typically tax a much 
smaller share of this smaller income. In many of the poorest developing countries, the 
budget is in deficit after the salaries of public employees have been paid. In the more 
developed of the developing countries, tax income may partially cover some of the 
spending on infrastructure, but even in these countries, much of the investment in 
infrastructure is typically financed by borrowing or aid. In most developing countries, 
very little tax revenue remains for financing redistribution. At the same time, 
developing countries typically face more serious problems of internal political conflict 
than advanced countries, given the wrenching social transformations that they are 
experiencing. This means that political stabilization cannot be organized through the 
public fisc in most developing countries.  
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Second, not only do advanced countries have significant tax revenues to achieve 
political stabilization, they also enjoy powerful internal feedback mechanisms that 
prevent or limit political demands that pose sustained threats to the viability of the 
productive sector. The main reason for this is that in advanced industrialized countries 
the standard of living of a significant proportion of the population depends directly or 
indirectly on the health of the capitalist sector. Apart from the capitalists and workers 
directly involved in this sector, the wellbeing of professionals, public sector 
employees and the self-employed depend on the taxes or the purchasing power of the 
capitalist sector. This means that although organized groups have every interest in 
pushing for redistribution to themselves, if their collective demands begin to restrict 
the growth of the productive sector, powerful feedback mechanisms begin to operate 
because all groups begin to lose out from the economic slowdown. This mechanism is 
not perfect, and there are clearly occasional crises, but in the main, political parties, 
trade unions and interest groups know that their redistributive demands will only be 
tolerated by other groups if they operate within the constraint of maintaining the 
viability of the capitalist sector. Not surprisingly, redistributive politics in advanced 
countries operates through periodic renegotiations of tax and spending priorities 
within relatively narrow ranges of variation. In contrast, in the typical developing 
country, the productive capitalist sector is relatively small and the wellbeing of most 
people in society is not affected by a change in the fortunes of this sector (except in 
the very long run). Consequently, even if the demands and activities of redistributive 
groups have serious implications for the economic viability of the productive sector, 
there are much more limited feedbacks limiting the demands of these groups. Not 
surprisingly, populist politics and clientelist political factions can persist in their 
strategies for long periods in developing countries.  
 
These two features of developing countries combine to provide a powerful set of 
drivers for political corruption that have little to do with the interventionist rent-
creation capacities of states and the greed and opportunity cost of public officials 
involved in rent creation. These drivers are shown in Figure 4. Redistributive 
demands in developing countries are driven by political factions. The organizational 
structure of these factions varies from country to country, and this variation has 
important implications for the extent of these demands and the types of political 
movements through which they are expressed. At the same time, compared to 
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advanced countries, state leaders in developing countries have much more limited 
formal tax resources to deal with these demands. The standard response of developing 
country states has therefore been to try and achieve political stability by selecting the 
most powerful or dangerous factional groups and transferring resources through 
informal patron-client networks to accommodate these groups.  
 
This results inevitably in political corruption for two reasons. First, most of the 
resources transferred down these networks are by definition off-budget resources 
often raised through corruption. In some cases, governing factions engage in 
corruption or predation and use the proceeds to accommodate powerful clients. In 
other cases, powerful clients may be allowed to raise resources for themselves 
through corruption with the state turning a blind eye on these activities. Second, even 
if some of the resources transferred to selected factions come from legal fiscal 
sources, their allocation to chosen groups is itself often an act of political corruption. 
This is because the available resources are typically insufficient for general 
disbursement to all groups so that their allocation to chosen groups often has to be 
less than transparent and often has to involve violations of formal rules for the 
political benefit of the public officials concerned.  
 
Political Instability,
Subverted Economic Interventions:
Accumulation Falters or Collapses
Political Stability,
Insulated Economic Interventions:
Capitalist Accumulation Continues
Political Stabilization using Off-Budget
Resources and Patron-Client Networks
Politically Driven Corruption to Raise
Off-Budget Resources
Developing Economy with
Limited Fiscal Resources
Political Factions seeking
Redistributive Rents
 
Figure 4 Drivers and Effects of Political Corruption in Developing Countries 
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 The impact of political corruption depends on the context. In some situations, political 
corruption can coexist with economic development, as shown along the left hand fork 
at the bottom of Figure 4. In these cases, the net effect of patron-client politics and 
political corruption is to achieve enough political stability for the growth of the 
capitalist sector to continue. A good example of this type of political corruption in a 
democracy is found in India, particularly in the eighties and nineties (Harriss-White 
and White 1996, Jenkins 2000, Harriss-White 2003). Here political stability and 
economic reforms were achieved not because the political system was finally free of 
political corruption but rather because patron-client networks were used to buy off the 
opposition using graft and obfuscation. By most accounts, political corruption in India 
was high and growing during this period. This does not mean that all successful 
developing countries must suffer from high levels of political corruption. In high-
growth Malaysia, which was moderately democratic in the eighties when growth took 
off, political corruption was controlled through the construction of an inclusive 
political coalition that allowed political stabilization through legal transfers to 
powerful constituencies while still allowing significant growth to happen in the 
productive sector (Khan 2000b: 98-101). As resources for political stabilization did 
not have to be raised and allocated outside the budget to the same extent as in other 
developing countries, Malaysia scored better on corruption indices than many of its 
peers at a similar level of development. But this was partly due to fortuitous features 
of Malaysian political economy, including in particular the more significant 
development of its productive sector before its high-growth period began, which 
could be taxed both directly and indirectly to generate revenues for redistribution.  
 
But most developing countries suffered from poor economic development and high 
political corruption as shown at the bottom of the right hand fork in Figure 4. In 
Africa, it used to be argued that political corruption in the form of neo-patrimonialism 
was due to the absence of democracy, and that authoritarianism allowed the 
continuation of personalized politics and the use of informal sources of power by the 
‘big men’ (Médard 2002). However, it is now more commonly recognized that neo-
patrimonialism and patron-client networks have survived the transition to democracy 
in Africa, and they continue to operate with relatively slight modifications (Chabal 
and Daloz 1999). Elected parties soon realize that staying in power involves 
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transmitting resources to powerful constituencies through patron-client networks and 
if anything, political corruption increased in many of these countries after 
democratization.  
 
Thus, high-growth and low-growth developing countries do not necessarily differ in 
terms of the extent of political corruption. Rather, the differences are first that in 
successful developers, redistributions through political corruption and other 
mechanisms achieved political stability while in less successful developers stability 
was not achieved. As a result, the ruling elite can take a long-term view in their policy 
interventions in successful developers but in the others, the ruling elite have a short 
time horizon and in extreme cases become predatory. Secondly, an important feature 
of successful developers is the insulation of critical economic interventions and the 
associated rents from the political processes through which political rents are 
allocated. The greater the separation, the greater the chance of sustaining high 
economic growth as a greater range of critical economic interventions will remain 
growth enhancing. The extent to which stability is achieved and political 
redistribution can be isolated from essential economic interventions depends on the 
structure of patron-client factions in the country, the institutions of representation and 
the fiscal resources available to the state (Khan 2000b).  
 
Given the drivers of this type of political corruption, it is not surprising that we find 
that its extent is hardly affected by greater transparency, higher public sector salaries 
or democratization. The only sustained long term effect on corruption of this type is 
likely to come from economic development, which is likely to result in a growing 
fiscal capacity of the state to respond to political demands in open, transparent and 
generalized ways. Economic development is also likely to lead to a moderation of the 
demands coming from competing groups demanding redistribution so that economic 
viability is disrupted to a lesser and lesser extent over time. The comparative evidence 
supports the view that there are no easy fixes for this type of corruption, which is a 
major driver of corruption in developing countries. The harm caused by this type of 
corruption depends on the organization of factional politics, and this can to some 
extent be altered through political restructuring. But if the aim is to achieve the degree 
of transparency and fiscal accountability observed in advanced countries, reformers in 
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developing countries are setting themselves an impossible task given their fiscal 
capacity and the factional demands they have to satisfy.  
 
Theft and Primitive Accumulation  
The most pernicious type of corruption in developing countries is predatory 
corruption by public officials. In this variant of corruption public officials directly, or 
indirectly through private factions, grab or assist in the grabbing of public resources, 
such as land or mineral resources, or collude in the extraction of ‘protection money’ 
from citizens. This type of predation can be observed in all types of societies, but its 
incidence is significantly greater in developing countries. Although theft by a private 
individual would normally not be defined as corruption, when the state colludes in 
and benefits from theft, or the theft is carried out directly by public officials, this 
involves corruption because it involves the use of public power for private benefit. In 
extreme cases, this type of corruption could be associated with a descent into 
warlordism, where warlords become the de facto state.  
 
Plunder in developing countries is also a systemic problem that seems to be associated 
with the transitional nature of these economies. Developing countries are typically 
characterized by a situation in which potentially valuable land and natural resources 
are owned by low productivity traditional users, often for various forms of collective 
use. At the same time, most industrial assets are also owned by low-productivity 
firms. As a result, asset owners collectively cannot produce enough of a surplus to pay 
for the protection of their assets through the tax system. Individual asset owners who 
do produce a surplus are forced to make private or semi-private arrangements for 
protecting their assets, for instance by paying protection money to private mafias, but 
most asset owners cannot afford this either. In such a context, it is difficult even with 
the best political will for the state to ensure a satisfactory protection of property rights 
across the board. The most likely outcome is that the state or parts of it become 
variants of the mafia, providing private protection at a price to those who can afford 
it. The difference between predation and protection can very quickly become blurred 
in these contexts. Much of the police corruption in developing countries takes this 
more serious predatory form (compared to the neoclassical form discussed earlier), 
with police and security services often engaging in direct expropriation or allowing 
expropriation by those who can afford to pay them. With a high degree of 
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coordination of the protection services offered by the state, the outcome can be 
effective protection for privileged asset holders who may even be assisted in capturing 
further assets from those less able to buy protection. But with high degrees of 
fragmentation in the provision of protection, the outcome can be sequential extortion 
even from potentially productive producers by different agencies with the result that 
the economy collapses.  
 
There are obvious parallels between these processes and the descriptions of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ in early capitalism coming from classical political economists, in 
particular Karl Marx. Marx was referring to non-market transfers during transitions 
from pre-capitalist to capitalist modes of organizing production. The transfer of assets 
from pre-capitalist sectors to the emerging capitalist sector has never happened 
entirely through market exchanges. According to Marx, in the context of the transition 
to capitalism in England, primitive accumulation involved theft, the enclosure of 
common lands, colonial plunder, the use of political power to engineer unequal 
exchange, the protection of markets and transfers through the fiscal mechanism (Marx 
1979: 873-940; Wood 2002). Thus, primitive accumulation involves more than 
plunder, nor is all plunder primitive accumulation. If the ensuing transition takes 
society in the direction of a viable capitalist economy that can produce a significant 
economic surplus, this can eventually pay for the protection of the new structure of 
rights, and the primitive accumulation eventually ends. 
 
Corruption related to the expropriation of property rights is particularly important 
given the importance attached to the stability of property rights in explaining the 
poverty of many developing countries (North 1990; Knack and Keefer 1997). 
However, property rights are unstable and contestable to varying degrees in every 
developing country, and they have been so in every country during early stages of 
development. This is not surprising once we identify the structural factors that can 
explain why involuntary, non-market asset transfers are common in these situations. 
Stable property rights require a significant public infrastructure of laws, courts and 
enforcement mechanisms that can ensure that property rights are clearly defined and 
that their enforcement is a public good that does not depend on individual asset-
holders spending money to protect specific assets. This infrastructure is an expensive 
investment, but one that pays for itself over time. The problem for developing 
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countries is that existing economic assets are (by definition) not being used in very 
profitable ways and most economic activities do not produce significant surpluses that 
could be taxed to provide for the collective enforcement of property rights. This 
chicken and egg problem can explain why property rights are uniformly weak across 
developing countries.  
 
The absence of an adequate taxable surplus in developing countries that could allow 
the protection of property rights as a public good has two interrelated effects. On the 
one hand, the absence of public resources needed to provide an infrastructure of 
protection means that many assets are vulnerable to expropriation. Public officials are 
implicated if they turn a blind eye to the activities of expropriators who provide them 
with kickbacks or who are their clients. Furthermore, public officials sometimes 
directly engage in expropriation themselves. On the other hand, the high transaction 
costs of organizing voluntary sales of assets can prevent the purchase of assets by 
potentially efficient users from current, less efficient users, even if public officials are 
not engaged in non-market transfers. The implications of the second effect are very 
significant. If the possibility of legal contracting is limited because of the high 
transaction costs of market exchanges, it is possible to explain why many transfers of 
assets, even in rapidly growing developing countries, take place through non-market 
mechanisms. These non-market transfers are typically driven by the greed and 
opportunism of expropriators rather than a calculation of net social benefit. 
Nevertheless, they may sometimes result in an improvement in asset allocation. This 
arguably happened in the case of the enclosures and other forms of primitive 
accumulation that led to the emergence of English capitalism. But equally, if greed 
and opportunism drive non-market transfers, there is no guarantee that the outcome 
will be socially beneficial.  
 
In developing counties, powerful groups and factions in society are likely to be 
engaged in a struggle to restructure ownership and the organization of production or 
to capture weakly protected assets using their political power. The uncomfortable 
historical fact is that successful transitions to capitalism did not take place because 
pre-capitalist property rights were respected and only transferred through voluntary 
exchanges. Both in rapid developers and in other societies, periods of transition 
involved significant non-market transfers, but specific and contingent historical 
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factors, in particular, pre-existing class and group organizations of some societies 
ensured that expropriators had incentives and compulsions to invest in productive 
enterprises and were not themselves subsequently targets of further expropriation. 
Recent scholarship has pointed out the importance of the configuration of pre-existing 
social organizations in determining the trajectories of transition in Europe (Wood 
2002; Aston and Philpin 1987). Similar differences in social organization can help to 
explain the differences between successful and less successful transitions in Asia 
(Khan and Jomo 2000). 
 
The drivers and effects of the corruption associated with theft and primitive 
accumulation are shown in Figure 5. At first, low-productivity pre-capitalist economic 
sectors dominate the economy and explain the relatively low taxable surplus available 
to provide effective protection and enforcement of the underlying rights. The 
organizational structure of society determines how groups mobilize in response to 
these weakly defined and contestable rights to expropriate the assets of others or 
protect their own. We expect to see a wide range of non-market transfers in these 
contexts, ranging from theft and land grabs that are undoubtedly corrupt to politically 
organized transfers such as land reform. In between are transfers that are legal but 
open up possibilities of corruption, such as some privatization strategies, prioritized 
allocation of land and other resources for specific sectors or uses, and so on. As in the 
cases of corruption discussed earlier, the outcomes are not predetermined.  
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Figure 5 Drivers and Effects of Theft and Primitive Accumulation 
 
If the expropriators of today can subsequently purchase protection at a price that 
allows them to avoid further expropriation, the period of primitive accumulation could 
lead to an emerging capitalism. The emerging productive economy can then begin to 
pay taxes and create state capacities that permit a transition to the stabilization and 
enforcement of property rights. Unfortunately, the norm in most developing countries 
is one where expropriators are in turn expropriated, where incentives for productive 
investments do not emerge, and where the non-market transfers appear to be overtly 
predatory and destructive for the society’s economic prospects. In other cases, as in 
Russia, expropriators face limited or no compulsions for productivity growth and 
become instead monopolists who can use their market power to extract from 
consumers. Here expropriators may be able to pay for the protection of their rights but 
a second round of redistribution or the construction of institutions that can compel 
productivity growth may be required to enhance social output.  
 
In a broad sense, expropriation can also be analysed as a variant of rent seeking. The 
equivalent of the rent here is the asset or income that public officials can expropriate 
or help others to expropriate using their political or military power. The rent seeking 
cost is the wasteful use of resources by different groups of expropriators in the course 
of maintaining their positions of power within or over the state. Despite these 
similarities with other types of rent seeking, the drivers of this type of corruption are 
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very different from those discussed earlier. In particular, expropriation is not based on 
state capacities to intervene, but rather on the absence of well-defined and well-
protected property rights in society, which in turn create incentives for expropriation. 
 
A focus on reform strategies that aim to address the predatory capacities of the state 
through greater transparency and accountability and by strengthening the enforcement 
capacities of the state is unlikely to be effective because the economy does not 
produce an adequate surplus to pay for the protection of underlying rights. This lack 
of resources is a critical structural driver of property rights instability that is unlikely 
to be adequately addressed before a substantial transition to a productive economy has 
already happened and the required revenues are available for the protection and 
enforcement of rights across the board. In the meantime, strategies responding to the 
typically adverse effects of predatory theft and corruption are most likely to work if 
they can change social organizations and state capacities to ensure that the non-market 
transfers that characterize every transition lead to a more productive economic 
structure. Unfortunately, our understanding of these conditions is still very poor and 
certainly not robust enough to generate reform strategies that are likely to enjoy a 
wide base of support. 
 
A Classification of Corrupt Transactions  
The discussion so far has distinguished between four types of corruption in 
developing countries based on differences in the underlying drivers. From a policy 
perspective, it is useful to present this classification slightly differently. Although all 
corruption involves the violation of some formal rules of conduct, Table 2 classifies 
the types of corruption discussed here in terms of the characteristics of underlying 
state interventions that generate the corrupt behaviour. There are two areas of 
difference in the underlying state interventions. First, the underlying interventions 
may be either potentially beneficial or potentially harmful. Second, the underlying 
interventions may be either legal or illegal. These two sets of differences identify four 
distinct types of corruption in Table 2. These distinctions are important for identifying 
the policies that may be appropriate for dealing with different types of corruption and 
for identifying types of corruption that may not be amenable to any simple policies in 
developing countries.  
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Table 2. A Typology of Corruption based on Associated Interventions 
Legal Interventions Illegal Interventions
Potentially
Beneficial 
Interventions
Damaging 
Interventions
2) Statist Corruption. Net effect can be 
beneficial or damaging depending on how 
seriously corruption subverts interventions.
Anti-corruption policy should address drivers 
to prevent subversion.
3) Variants of Political Corruption and 
Primitive Accumulation. Net effect depends 
on degree of political stability achieved, 
insulation from economic interventions and 
the emergence of productive capitalists.
Anti-corruption policy should seek to increase 
likelihood of these outcomes.
1) Neoclassical Corruption. Net effect of 
intervention always negative. 
Anti-corruption policy should remove these 
state capacities through liberalization and 
privatization.
4) Variants of Political Corruption and 
Predation/Theft. Net effect always negative: 
possible descent into warlordism and anarchy.
Anti-corruption policy has to strengthen 
centralized coercive power of the state.
 
 
The first and simplest type, called neoclassical corruption, is shown in the bottom left 
hand box in Table 2. Here corruption is associated with the legal capacity of the state 
to intervene, but these interventions create damaging rents or restrictions in markets. 
Here, the mainstream policy recommendations of liberalization and privatization 
together with institutional reforms to increase the opportunity cost of corruption are 
appropriate. But it is doubtful if this is the most important type of corruption in 
developing countries. If this is only a part of the corruption problem, and if in 
addressing this, policies damage the state’s development prospects by limiting state 
intervention, then these policies may hinder, rather than help, the struggle against 
corruption in the long-run. It is therefore important to assess the relative importance 
of other types and drivers of corruption before devising policy responses.  
 
The second type of corruption is statist corruption, which is distinguished by being 
associated with state interventions that are legal and potentially beneficial for society. 
These interventions include such things as managing taxes and tariffs to accelerate 
technological progress and catching-up by domestic industry, the regulation of 
financial markets and the allocation of credit or the prioritization of infrastructure 
construction. These are precisely the types of interventions that heterodox theories of 
the state have identified as critical in developing countries going through rapid 
transitions and catching up with advanced countries. Clearly, corruption in these areas 
can have a much more significant effect on the economy, both in terms of growth and 
distribution. Here corruption can reduce the social benefit of the intervention or even 
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make the intervention a damaging one. Indeed, in most cases, the subversion and 
distortion is so severe that ex post many cases of statist corruption may be 
indistinguishable from neoclassical corruption because the potential benefit of the 
associated intervention is not obvious. Nevertheless, we have argued that 
liberalization would not necessarily be the most appropriate response. If potentially 
useful state functions are subverted, the underlying political economy of why this 
happens has to be addressed. Otherwise, strategies of state withdrawal risk throwing 
the baby out with the bathwater.  
 
The right hand column in Table 2 looks at corruption associated with interventions 
that are not legal and cannot be made legal. All types of political corruption, primitive 
accumulation and theft would be in one or other of the two right hand boxes, but it is 
quite important to be able to distinguish between them. The two boxes differ in terms 
of whether the underlying interventions are potentially beneficial or not. If the illegal 
interventions associated with the corruption are beneficial for society, as in box 3, the 
consequences are likely to be far less serious than if the underlying interventions are 
damaging as in box 4.  
 
Box 3 describes corrupt transactions arising from potentially beneficial interventions 
that are not or cannot be made legal include some variants of political corruption and 
primitive accumulation. We have seen that off-budget political stabilization typically 
cannot be legal but may be necessary given the inadequacy of fiscal resources and the 
pressure for political accommodation coming from powerful political factions in 
society. Similarly, many forms of primitive accumulation cannot be made legal, but 
these non-market transfers may be necessary to achieve rapid asset re-allocations to 
users who are more productive. Thus, a subset of both political corruption and of 
primitive accumulation may be potentially growth enhancing, and even in the 
presence of substantial corruption may actually be so, given the alternatives. 
However, the outcomes of these types of interventions are very susceptible to the 
precise form of the political economy and institutional drivers discussed above.  
 
These drivers may be conducive for economic development and political stability. For 
instance, the net effect of some types of political corruption may be sufficient political 
stability for accumulation and growth to continue. The organization of the political 
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factions that are accommodated through political corruption may also be such that 
they can be satisfied through rent allocations that do not require the subversion of 
necessary economic interventions. Political corruption may then be associated with 
illegal state actions that are nevertheless consistent with economic development. In 
the same way, the organization of factions may be such that the primitive 
accumulation induced by weakly defined property rights allows rapid asset transfers 
to an emerging productive capitalist class.  
 
In these cases, anti-corruption strategies need to address the issue of converting the 
illegal rent seeking associated with otherwise beneficial state interventions into legal 
rent seeking that can be regulated in transparent ways over time. Some of these 
processes of legalization are made both easier and more necessary by the process of 
economic development itself. For instance, as economic development proceeds, 
growing fiscal resources mean that the dirty politics of patron-client alliances and 
payoffs can be replaced with transparent political stabilization and the stabilization of 
property rights. At the same time, the growth of interest-based political associations 
connected to a growing productive sector creates pressures for the political 
accommodation of broad interest groups rather than of personality-led political 
factions. This does not mean that the decline of political corruption is necessarily 
automatic as development proceeds. Here our analysis is different from the 
modernization theory developed by Samuel Huntington (1968) who argued that 
development would lead to the reduction of corruption. Economic development 
creates the conditions necessary for the removal of political corruption and primitive 
accumulation, but these conditions are by no means sufficient. It is often possible to 
find examples of political corruption and expropriation of property in relatively 
advanced countries. Thus, popular pressures for the appropriate institutional reforms 
are also necessary but are only likely to work once the economic conditions are 
conducive. 
 
Conversely, pressure alone is not sufficient to reduce political corruption if political 
power cannot be maintained using fiscal strategies of redistribution, nor can pressure 
stop primitive accumulation if assets are unproductive and cannot pay for their own 
protection. Any government will be unable to stabilize a system of property rights that 
are not viable in the sense of producing a big enough surplus that can pay for their 
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protection. In the same way, governments that lack a substantial fiscal base are likely 
to have to engage in forms of political corruption to distribute off-budget resources to 
powerful constituencies in order to survive. Political mobilization, democratization 
and demands for integrity will do little to reduce these types of corruption in most 
developing countries. In fact, developing countries that have attempted to root out 
corruption through public mobilization have uniformly failed to make a lasting dent in 
the problem. Mass movements against government corruption became common in 
many developing countries from the 1980s onwards. In a number of countries 
including the Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh, mass movements resulted in the 
toppling of corrupt governments but in all these countries successor governments 
were soon found to be just as corrupt. In most cases, public mobilization did little to 
reduce the problem in the long term, though there have sometimes been short-term 
reductions in corruption because of public pressure.  
 
Much more serious are the cases where political corruption and non-market asset 
transfers lead to economic collapse, a possibility classified in box 4 in Table 2. 
Because the underlying state interventions in this case are damaging as well as being 
illegal, this is clearly the worst type of corruption. The category is only likely to be 
important if the social order is breaking down. Public officials are, by definition, 
engaging in interventions that are directly damaging the economy. Because this hurts 
the interests of public officials collectively, this type of corruption can only become 
significant if higher levels of the state have lost control over lower levels, or if the 
state has begun to fragment horizontally. Once this happens, all types of public 
officials, from police and security services to political leaders and their factions may 
engage in expropriation. Although there are aspects of such extortions in every 
society, it only takes on significant proportions in failed or failing states, which are 
characterized by the failure of higher levels of the state to discipline lower levels. 
Some degree of extortion can always take place at lower levels of the state, but where 
higher levels have the capacity to prevent it, they are not likely to have any interest in 
allowing this extortion to continue, because it is unlikely to aid their own 
accumulation and stabilization strategies. If the state can enforce discipline, then even 
if higher-level bureaucrats and politicians are primarily interested in personal 
enrichment, they will do better by promoting development rather than predation 
(Khan 1996a). It is, therefore, very likely that higher levels of the state will engage in 
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predatory extortion only if they fail to impose discipline on lower levels and on their 
clients. Under these conditions, the center can rationally join other expropriators in 
short-term predation, as they have no better strategy.  
 
Corruption of this type is particularly serious because, just as in the third group, it is 
difficult to see how such corruption can be realistically addressed before the state has 
achieved a relatively high degree of development. But here, corruption threatens to 
prevent the very development that is necessary for its solution. Political corruption 
here fails to achieve political stabilization. Similarly, contested property rights are 
captured by expropriators who in turn enjoy little security from other expropriators or 
have other reasons for having very short time horizons that induce them to consume 
their gains or invest them outside the country. In these cases, the non-market asset 
transfers are very different from the primitive accumulation that led to the emergence 
of capitalism in successful developers, and they are, instead, purely predatory 
expropriations that are well known in many developing countries.  
 
As a result, countries where these types of corruption are important face very serious 
challenges that are very unlikely to be resolved using the policy responses appropriate 
for neoclassical corruption. Unfortunately, the drivers of both political corruption and 
of primitive accumulation and theft are powerful enough to ensure that attempts to 
counter these types of corruption through democratization, transparency reforms and 
state withdrawal from intervention are unlikely to have much effect. In these 
circumstances, there is a very limited range of drivers that policy can address. Policy 
can seek to address the complex political economy determining the organization and 
structure of factional competition. We know there are countries where political 
reorganization enabled a shift in the division between type 4 and type 3 corruption 
(Khan 2000b), which can in turn create some of the preconditions for development 
and thereby help to reduce corruption over time. These examples of political 
reorganization include the coming to power of Park Chung Hee in South Korea in 
1961 and the organization of the National Front government in Malaysia after the 
riots of 1969. In countries where the fragmentation of the polity has gone some way 
towards warlordism and anarchy, policy also has to address the political question of 
how to reconstruct the centralized coercive powers of the state. Far from 
liberalization, democratization and civil society pressure, the priority in these cases 
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has to be a much more fundamental Hobbesian one of constructing the political basis 
for the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. 
 
Conclusions 
By breaking down corruption into a number of different types, and recognizing their 
interdependencies, it is possible to explain why the prior reduction of corruption 
across the board may not be a viable goal for most developing countries. Some types 
of corruption are simply not going to be significantly reduced in societies going 
through social transformations, even in societies where such transformations 
eventually turn out to be successful. At the same time, this is not to deny that 
corruption is a problem. Very few developing countries have graduated to become 
dynamic capitalist economies. In poorly performing economies, corruption is 
damaging because it subverts critical state functions or is associated with failing 
processes of primitive accumulation or political stabilization. In extreme cases, 
corruption can be associated with state collapse and a descent into warlordism.  
 
However, our analysis suggests that in each case, the policy response has to be based 
on identifying the main drivers of corruption and on strengthening state capacities 
required for achieving rapid transformation and high growth rates. An analysis of 
governance capacities in high-growth developing economies can play an important 
role in identifying critical transformational state capacities that may be subverted by 
specific types of corruption that dominate in particular countries. If the necessary state 
capacities for accelerating transformation can be achieved, a low-growth economy 
can transform itself into a high-growth one. Paradoxically, our prediction is that in 
these countries corruption will coexist with growth for a time until the conditions for 
dealing with political corruption and asset stabilization are achieved.  
 
The critical question for policy-makers in developing countries is the mix between 
different types of corruption identified in Table 2 rather than the aggregate level of 
corruption. Our analysis is consistent with the two observations raised by the cross-
country data summarized in Figure 1, namely that developing countries in general 
have higher average levels of corruption compared to advanced countries and that 
high and low growth developing countries do not have significantly different average 
levels of corruption. The first observation is explained by the fact that advanced 
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countries do not have powerful drivers for political corruption and primitive 
accumulation. Greater tax revenues mean that political stabilization can be achieved 
with legal rents in the form of transparent fiscal transfers. At the same time, the 
productive sector generates enough of a surplus to pay taxes for the effective 
protection of property rights, limiting the possibility of expropriation. Rent seeking 
nevertheless remains widespread in advanced countries because state interventions 
(both beneficial and damaging) remain very extensive and there is rent seeking to 
capture the associated rents. But advanced countries can convert a large part of this 
rent seeking into legal rent seeking because rent seekers are well established and 
enjoy much greater legitimacy and can therefore legitimately seek to influence state 
policy. But, even though advanced countries may have converted a significant amount 
of corruption into legal rent seeking, this does not mean that they have low rent 
seeking costs. Moreover, some corruption will always remain but this residual 
corruption can be controlled by increasing the opportunity cost of corruption for 
public officials in the way neoclassical analysis suggests.  
 
We explain the second observation by pointing out that although the drivers of 
political corruption and primitive accumulation ensure that corruption in the aggregate 
is likely to be high in every developing country, the mix between the different types 
of political corruption, primitive accumulation and theft shown in Table 2 can vary 
widely across developing countries. Moreover, the type of political corruption that 
dominates has interdependent effects on the type of statist corruption. The difference 
between high and low growth developing countries is rooted in their underlying 
political structures. In the former, we would expect to see a substantial amount of 
statist corruption but the state’s interventionist capacities have not been entirely 
subverted by corruption, and corruption occurs along with successful political 
stabilization and primitive accumulation. There may be some extortion and some 
neoclassical corruption, but these would be relatively limited, because a coherent state 
leadership would have nothing to gain by allowing these types of corruption. In 
contrast, in poorly performing developing countries, we would expect to see 
damaging political corruption, and predatory asset transfers. As a result, we would 
also expect statist corruption to be associated with much more distorted interventions 
and often indistinguishable from neoclassical corruption. It follows that to be 
effective, the policy debate in poorly performing developing countries has to address 
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the political economy drivers of corruption that shift the balance between different 
types of corruption. Attempts to fight corruption across the board using instruments 
that are in any case most appropriate for neoclassical corruption are not likely to 
succeed. 
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